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High Blood Pressure

PTSD/combat-stress association with incident hypertension supporting secondary service connection.

38 CFR diagnostic code 7101

Controlling law

The CFR sections and cases the theories relevant to this condition rest on — the legal standard raters evaluate against, never a prediction about any claim.

Direct (§ 3.303)

Regulation

  • 38 C.F.R. § 3.303

    Direct service connection — a current disability linked to service. (Continuity of symptomatology under § 3.303(b) is limited by case law to the § 3.309(a) chronic diseases — Walker.)

Case law

  • Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

    The three-element test: current disability, in-service event, and a nexus between them.

  • Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

    Federal Circuit restatement of the same three direct-service-connection elements.

  • Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995)

    The evidentiary framework a rater weighs each element against.

  • Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

    Continuity of symptomatology (§ 3.303(b)) is available ONLY for a chronic disease listed in § 3.309(a); any other condition must use the medical-nexus pathway.

  • Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

    A categorical 'a medical opinion is always required for nexus' is legal error — competent lay evidence can suffice.

  • Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994)

    A veteran is competent to report symptoms they personally observe (Layno), and lay evidence can even establish a simple diagnosis in the right case (Jandreau).

  • McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006)

    A LOW threshold — evidence that merely indicates a nexus MAY exist obligates VA to provide a C&P exam.

  • 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990)

    When the evidence is in relative equipoise, the tie goes to the veteran — the preponderance must be AGAINST the claim to deny it.

Secondary (§ 3.310)

Regulation

  • 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a)

    A condition proximately caused by a service-connected condition (or by the treatment it requires).

  • 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b)

    A condition worsened beyond its natural progression by a service-connected condition.

Case law

  • Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509 (1998)

    The three secondary elements: a current disability, a service-connected disability, and medical-nexus evidence linking them.

  • Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995)

    Secondary aggravation is compensable for the degree of worsening over the pre-aggravation baseline.

  • El-Amin v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 136 (2013)

    An opinion addressing only causation is inadequate where aggravation is also raised — the letter must speak to both prongs.

  • Spicer v. McDonough, 61 F.4th 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2023)

    Expanded what qualifies (severity-worsening and treatment-based theories suffice; a § 3.310(b) baseline/permanence objection cannot defeat a but-for severity theory). Not a heightened standard.

  • 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990)

    When the evidence is in relative equipoise, the tie goes to the veteran — the preponderance must be AGAINST the claim to deny it.

Aggravation (§ 3.306)

Regulation

  • 38 C.F.R. § 3.306 (38 U.S.C. § 1153)

    DIRECT aggravation: a pre-existing condition NOTED AT ENTRY that increased in disability during service — unless the increase is due to the natural progress of the disease. An in-service increase raises a PRESUMPTION of aggravation VA must rebut.

  • 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b)

    SECONDARY aggravation (a distinct branch): a non-service-connected condition worsened by an already service-connected condition — see Allen.

Case law

  • Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

    If the condition was NOT noted at entry, the veteran is presumed sound; VA must rebut BOTH pre-existence and lack of aggravation by clear and unmistakable EVIDENCE (not the CUE error doctrine). If VA fails, the claim proceeds as ordinary DIRECT service connection — not as an aggravation claim.

  • Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 231 (2012)

    That rebuttal burden never shifts back to the veteran — VA must rely on affirmative evidence of no aggravation.

  • Hunt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 292 (1991); Davis v. Principi, 276 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

    Temporary flare-ups are not aggravation — the UNDERLYING condition (not just symptoms) must have worsened.

  • Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995)

    Compensation is for the measurable degree of worsening over the established baseline.

  • 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990)

    When the evidence is in relative equipoise, the tie goes to the veteran — the preponderance must be AGAINST the claim to deny it.

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Educational information about the evidentiary standard — not legal or medical advice, and never a prediction about any claim.